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This paper presents a regional analysis of the effects of educational poli-
cies implemented in Spain between 1992 and 2003, focusing specifically
on school failure rates. We consider the impact of expenditure per pupil,
class size, and pupil-teacher ratio on dropout rates at the end of compul-
sory education and on the proportion of early school-leavers in the 18-24
year age group. Our results indicate that higher levels of educational ex-
penditure per pupil and lower class sizes and pupil-teacher ratios reduce
rates of dropout and early school-leaving (although class-size is not al-
ways significant). However, the magnitude of the effects of these varia-
bles is small at the average level.
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In order to improve students’ performance, Spanish governments have imple-
mented a large amount of legislation on education in the past twenty years (in our
view, an excessive amount, with six fundamental laws since 1985). These re-
forms, introduced by the central government, extended the period of compulsory
education from 14 to 16 years old and reorganized the educational system in a bid
to raise the standards. In general, however, the effects on students’ performance
have not met expectations. In addition, these reforms have been accompanied by
an intensive process of decentralization, to the extent that, by 2003, Spain’s 17 re-
gional governments (or Autonomous Communities, ACs) administered more than
90% of the educational budget (MEC, 2006b).
Performance problems are not distributed equally among the ACs (MEC,
2006a). Though, to a large extent, the differences may be attributed to the charac-
teristics of each AC (for example, its level of economic development, the nature
of its labour market, rural/urban population distribution, etc.), the educational po-
licies pursued by regional governments may also have had an effect on the regio-
nal differences in educational results. The main goal of the present study is to
examine the effects of policy on educational performance at a regional level. Spe-
cifically, we consider the effects of three policy instruments –expenditure per
pupil, class size and pupil-teacher ratio– on two educational outcomes related to
academic failure: regional dropout rates at the end of compulsory education (at
age 16), and the regional share of early school-leavers in the 18-24 age group.
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of educational policies on stu-
dent performance (including the three instruments considered in this paper) is not
conclusive [see Heyneman and Loxley (1983), Betts (1995), Akerhielm (1995),
Woessman (2001) and Hanushek (2003)]. The published results are inconsistent.
For example, while Bradley, Johnes and Millington (2001) report that the higher
the pupil-teacher ratio, the poorer the results among English secondary students
(period 1993-1998), in the TIMSS analysis (the Third International Mathematics
and Science Study, 2003, which presented results for 39 countries), Woessman
found that a higher level of expenditure per pupil, lower class sizes and lower
pupil-teacher ratios had a negative incidence on students’ results. There are two
reasons for this conflicting evidence: first, the results are highly sensitive to the
variables considered and to the econometric method implemented; second, policy
effectiveness depends heavily on local characteristics (for example, legislation,
specific government policy, etc.).
At this point, we should stress that our study was carried out during a period
of disruption in the Spanish education system. In 2006 and 2007, the whole edu-
cational system was reformed with the adoption of two new laws: one related to
non-university education, the 2006 Education Act (Ley Orgánica de Educación),
and the other related to universities, the Universities Act of 2007 (Ley Orgánica
de Universidades), modifying the earlier version passed in 2001. As noted above,
the international indicators published at this time also reflected Spain’s poor edu-
cational standing among European Union and OECD countries and highlighted
the significant differences between Spanish regions. The present study is the first
to examine these data at the regional level in an attempt to analyze the effects of
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our three educational policy instruments on school failure rates. Furthermore, the
paper generates a new variable for determining regional expenditure per pupil.
In conducting the empirical analysis, a misspecification bias appears if regio-
nal characteristics related either to educational policies or to environmental featu-
res are omitted. This bias is exacerbated when working with aggregate samples
and can produce misleading results (Hanushek, 2003). Here, we estimate panel
data fixed effects so as not to omit key environmental and regional variables and
to partially capture the unobserved heterogeneity. Specifically, since dependent
variables range between 0 and 1, we use a generalized linear model. The analysis
also takes into consideration the endogeneity problem that may arise between
educational outcomes and instruments.
Our results show that educational expenditure per pupil, class size, and
pupil-teacher ratio have the expected results on student failure rates: higher levels
of educational expenditure per pupil, lower class size, and lower pupil-teacher ra-
tios reduce rates of dropout and early school-leaving. However, the magnitude of
the effects of these variables is small at the average level.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section describes the effect
of the decentralization process on the provision of education in Spain. Section 2
presents the data and Section 3 describes the econometric strategy used in the em-
pirical analysis. Section 4 shows the main findings, and the final section contains
the conclusions.
1. DECENTRALIZATION AND THE REGIONAL PROVISION OF EDUCATION IN SPAIN
We conduct our analysis at regional level in order to identify differences in
school failure rates from region to region but, more importantly, we choose this
level because part of the responsibility for education in Spain was gradually trans-
ferred from central to regional governments during the period under analysis
(1992-2003). Although there is a common legal framework for the whole country,
AC governments legislate on certain educational matters. In addition, regional go-
vernments administer most of the educational budget: between 1992 and 2003,
the proportion of expenditure managed by regional government rose from 60.2%
to 95.4% (MEC, 2006b).
This high degree of decentralization occurred not only in education but in
most social policies as well. Responsibility for the administration of social issues
has been gradually transferred to the regional governments [see Arze, Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab (2005)]. However, the process has been very uneven, with
some AC governments taking charge of social policies at the beginning of the
1980s while others had to wait until the end of the 1990s. In the case of educa-
tion, of the 17 ACs, only seven (Andalusia, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Valencia,
Galicia, Navarre and the Basque Country) had some responsibility for education
in the 1980s whilst, for the remaining ACs, responsibility in this area was transfe-
rred from the central government (specifically from the Ministry of Education and
Science) between 1997 and 1999 (the dates of the transfer of responsibilities to
each AC government are shown in annex 1).
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The differences observed in the process of transferring political responsibili-
ties to ACs can be attributed to two factors: the political relationship between the
central and regional governments and the differences in the recognition that the
Spanish Constitution grants to the various ACs. In fact, ACs can be divided into
two types, depending on the route taken to autonomy: on the one hand, those allo-
wed to follow article 151 of the Constitution and the so called Foral Communi-
ties, which were granted powers over areas such as education and health; and, on
the other, ACs covered by article 143 of the Constitution, in which the transfer le-
vels are lower (see annex 1). Nevertheless, in an ongoing process, ‘article 143-
ACs’ have also assumed responsibilities related to health and education [Pereyra
(2002)] for a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of the process of decen-
tralization with regard to education.
Finally, in educational provision, it has to be taken into account that there are
two constraints operating at the regional level: the existence of limited resources
and the welfare decisions of regional governments when allocating spending.
With regard to the first point, while there has been a considerable degree of de-
centralization in public spending in Spain (comparable to countries with a long-
standing federal tradition), the level of decentralization in relation to revenues has
been significantly lower. In 1980, the central government received 88.9% of total
public revenue and the ACs received none (the rest being administered by local
authorities). By 2003, the central government’s share had fallen to 66.3% and the
ACs’ share had risen to 23.3%. In relation to expenditure, the central public sector
accounted for 89.5% of all expenditure in 1980, but only 54.6% in 2003; over this
period, the proportion of regional government expenditure increased from 0% to
32.1%. Therefore, there has been a major asymmetry between the decentralization
of expenditure and that of revenue.
2. REGIONAL DATA
Annual regional data correspond to the last decade available (1992-2003).
Table 1 presents the details concerning the definitions and sources of the variables
that are used in the article, and Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the ove-
rall variables. We consider two endogenous variables: the school dropout rate at
age 16 (defined as one minus the net share of schooling at that age), and the share
of early school-leavers at age 18-24 (defined as the population aged between 18
and 24 with no more than lower secondary education and is not in schooling or
training, which constitutes one of the 2010 Lisbon Objectives of the European
Union in education and training).
Average regional figures show that dropout and early school-leaver rates fell
for both sexes during the period considered (see Figures 1 and 2). These figures
also show a strong heterogeneous regional pattern for both rates and the ten-
dency. In addition, within each AC, gender differences are observed in school
dropout and early school-leaver rates. Note that there is a highly significant co-
rrelation between dropout and early school-leavers rates (0.84 for men and 0.85
for women).
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The educational instruments evaluated are overall non-university educational
expenditure per pupil, class size, and pupil-teacher ratio. Expenditure is deflated
by means of the regional educational inflation rate and includes public spending
on public and private non-university institutions by all levels of government (cen-
tral, regional and local) as well as family educational expenditure on non-univer-
sity levels. Pupils comprise students at public and private schools. We obtained
the statistics on the central government’s expenditure on education in the regions
in which education had not yet been transferred to the AC governments from the
General State Comptroller – the Intervención General de la Administración del
Estado, IGAE (see annex 2).
Class size is defined as the average number of students per educational unit
in lower secondary education (named ESO, Educación Secundaria Obligatoria).
The pupil-teacher ratio reflects the average number of students per teacher in pri-
mary and secondary education (there are no regional data available for secondary
education alone). Both variables include public and private schools. Though the
two variables do not address the same inputs, given that class size considers class-
room inputs other than just the number of teachers [Boozer and Rouse (2001)],
they are included as alternative factors in the estimations because, when compu-
ting the condition number, collinearity is observed (see Section 3).
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Table 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: 1992 vs. 2003
Variables 1992 2003
Endogenous Male dropout rates 0.240 (0.088) 0.138 (0.056)
variables Female dropout rates 0.178 (0.072) 0.080 (0.040)
Early male school-leavers 0.451 (0.080) 0.363 (0.088)
Early female school-leavers 0.350 (0.093) 0.234 (0.071)
Covariates Deflated overall 1.904 (0.352) 3.420 (0.702)
expenditure per pupil
Class-size 27.630 (1.376) 24.207 (1.682)
Pupil-teacher ratio 17.394 (1.278) 11.665 (1.052)
Young male unemployment rates 31.331 (14.38) 25.49 (8.136)
Young female unemployment 45.202 (10.380) 41.679 (9.109)
rates
Share of public educational 67.506 (10.284) 67.524 (9.059)
attendance
Average schooling years 7.14 (0.631) 8.76 (0.402)
Immigration schooling rates 0.462 (0.357) 5.675 (2.998)
Fertility rates for girls aged 15-19 9.817 (4.353) 9.934 (3.767)
Note: standard deviation reported in parentheses.
Source: Own elaboration.
Figure 3 shows the different position of each AC with regards to the three
educational policy instruments indicated above. The significant differences obser-
ved between ACs for each instrument may be important when considering educa-
tional policy implementation from a regional perspective.
In an international comparison, and related to secondary education for the
2003-2004 school year, the educational policy instruments show the following fi-
gures. With regard to overall expenditure per pupil (at educational institutions for
all services) Spain allocated 6,418 US$ (in Purchasing Power Parities) whilst the
average of all OECD countries was 6,962 US$. Considering class size (in lower
secondary school), the figure is 25 students per group in Spain (the highest in the
European Union, alongside Germany and Greece) compared with an OECD ave-
rage of 24. Finally, there were 10.8 pupils per teacher in Spain compared with an
OECD average of 13.6 [see MEC (2006a)].
In the case of exogenous control variables, various factors are taken into con-
sideration at regional level. First, since it is well known that the characteristics of
the labour market are relevant in school failure rates, we include the following va-
riables in our study: youth unemployment rates and the regional educational level.
In the former, unemployment may be related to lower levels of school dropout
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Figure 1
Male dropout Female dropout
Source: Own elaboration.
since the opportunity cost of remaining at school is reduced. Because unemploy-
ment levels are different for men and women, we consider them separately as
well as in lagged terms, since simultaneity may appear between dropout and
unemployment. Regional educational level is considered since more educated so-
cieties are expected to have a higher interest in reducing school dropout. It is cal-
culated from the average years of schooling of the working-age population.
Second, we consider variables related to the personal and family environ-
ment which may have an influence on the dependent variables, such as the regio-
nal fertility rates for 15-19-year-old women and the average number of children
per woman. Both variables are expected to increase school dropout (especially
that of women). Finally, we include two variables related to the school system:
the regional share of pupils attending public schools (public schools do not inclu-
de private public funded or “concerted” schools) and the percentage of immi-
grants at private and public schools. The first variable allows us to include a mea-
sure of a household’s educational preferences as well as the financial sacrifice
involved. In fact, strong regional heterogeneity in public/private school attendan-
ce is observed: while three regions (Catalonia, Madrid and the Basque Country)
show private school attendance rates of higher than 40%, most regions present
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Figure 2
Early male school-leavers Early female school-leavers
Source: Own elaboration.
Revista de Economía Aplicada
88
Figure 3
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Source: Own elaboration.
shares lower than 34%. Similarly, this variable reflects differential features in the
organization of teaching (such as diverse pupil-teacher ratios). The percentage of
immigrants at school provides information on educational demand derived from
diverse proportions of foreign students at the regional level (migration between
regions is not considered, since regional mobility between students is insignifi-
cant).
3. ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY
We should consider that preferences are not equal for Spanish regional go-
vernments, since differences in income per capita levels or other covariates may be
a proxy of differences in public goods preferences [Oates (1972)]. In order to par-
tially control the unobserved heterogeneity in the regional environment, we need to
include fixed effects [Besley and Case (2000)]. Moreover, preferences might chan-
ge over time [Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002)] and, therefore, panel data is ne-
eded. Finally, we also consider time dummies to capture trend changes. As a con-
sequence, here we estimate panel data with fixed and time effects.
However, the empirical analysis must also consider the presence of endoge-
neity because of i) reverse causality and ii) the fact that factors may be endoge-
nously determined. On one hand, educational policy instruments may reflect initial
regional differences in educational outcomes. On the other hand, according to Bes-
ley and Case (2000), this involves identifying the determinants of the policies that
are included on the right hand side of the regressions. Therefore, in the presence of
endogeneity, the estimated effects for educational policy instruments may be mis-
leading. For this reason, we use instrumental variables (IV). This strategy obliges
us first to check the endogeneity of all educational policies by means of the David-
son-Mackinnon test. The null hypothesis states that the OLS estimator would yield
consistent estimates. Then, the rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the
endogenous regressors’ effects on the estimates are meaningful. This is particularly
important because there is evidence that IV provides a less efficient estimation
than OLS when exogeneity is common. The instruments used for expenditure per
pupil are per capita regional resources (defined as total regional government finan-
cial resources in per capita terms considering homogeneous responsibilities1) and
the regional share of people receiving grants, since both instruments are related to
expenditure. The instruments used for class size and pupil-teacher ratio are the
share of students in rural schools and regional population density. The Davidson-
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(1) This variable is an index where the Spanish average equals 100 and all ACs are ordered conside-
ring total regional financial resources per capita. It is assumed that all regions are responsible for pro-
viding health and social services. For the 1992-97 period, the index is provided by de la Fuente and
Vives (2003). For 2002-2004, de la Fuente and Gundín (2008) give information only for non-Foral
regions. Thus, we consider the per capita revenue ratio between the Basque Country and Catalonia
for 2005 [see de la Fuente (2008)] to compute the revenue for the two Foral ACs. Then, we compute
the average revenue per capita for all 17 regions and we obtain the corresponding index where each
AC is allocated. For the 1998-2001 period, where data is unavailable, interpolation was needed.
Mackinnon test does not reject the exogeneity assumption for all educational po-
licy variables. Hence, IV estimation is not finally considered.
Our final econometric model is shown in equation [1]. Yi,t represents the regio-
nal educational outcomes: school dropout rates at age 16, and share of early school-
leavers between ages 18-24. Ei,t are the educational policy instruments (overall non-
university educational expenditure per pupil, class size and pupil-teacher ratio), Vi,t
is the regional demand for public education (the share of students enrolled in public
schools), and Xi,t denotes the region’s environmental characteristics (including fa-
mily and school as well as the labour market). The dependent variables are conside-
red separately for gender, since significant differences are observed. For Spain, the
average dropout rate for males is 5.3 percentage points higher than for females
(17.9% vs. 12.6%, and in the case of early school-leavers 38.2% vs. 27%, respecti-
vely). We follow the method proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) who show
that the Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimator (QMLE) is a better alternative when
the dependent variable is, as in our case, a fractional value. These authors propose a
generalized linear model (GLM) for estimating the expected values of dependent
variables (Yi,t) conditional on a vector of covariates, where G is any cumulative dis-
tribution function and the βs are the population parameters:
E(Yi,t / Ei,t, Vi,t, Xi,t) = G(Ei,t β1, Vi,t β2, Xi,t β3) [1]
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) recommend a logistic distribution and the use of
the Bernoulli log-likelihood function to obtain the QMLE of the βs. Thus, the best
course of action is to estimate using a GLM with a binomial exponential distribu-
tion and a logit as the link function for linearizing. We also consider robust standard
errors and regional dummies to collect unobserved regional heterogeneity (fixed ef-
fects). Previously, we also test the preference of considering fixed effects rather than
random ones by means of the Hausman test (χ2 = 75.47, p > χ2 = 0.00). Likewise,
there is multicollinearity when educational policy variables are introduced at the
same time since correlations are considerably high (expenditure correlates -0.57
with class size and -0.70 with pupil-teacher ratio, whereas the correlation between
class size and pupil-teacher ratio is 0.79). For efficiency reasons, we introduce
them separately into our estimates. Following Borland, Howsen and Trawick
(2005), we test several relationships between educational instruments (Ei,t) and
school failure rates to avoid the use of an incorrect functional form. We include
the squared values of expenditure per pupil, class-size and pupil-teacher ratio but
none of them were statistically significant.
Furthermore, in the empirical analysis we consider a dummy variable for each
AC related to the LOGSE (the 1990 Spanish Education Act named Ley Orgánica
de Ordenación General del Sistema Educativo). We do not consider the year when
LOGSE was implemented, but when its effects were observed (when students edu-
cated in the LOGSE system reached 16 years old). These dummy variables are in-
cluded in the analysis of school dropout at age 16 but not for early school leavers
aged 18-24 since the implementation of LOGSE is not relevant.
Finally, we consider other covariates such as the regional population density,
regional crime rates, the share of women teachers in each region and dummies in-
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dicating the leading party in each regional government. None of these additional
variables are statistically significant and the results are robust to their omission
(results available upon request). As a consequence of the reduced panel dimen-
sion, and to avoid either inefficiency effects arising from the inclusion of irrele-
vant variables or multicollinearity, we exclude all these additional covariates.
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Table 3 shows the results for school dropout rates at age 16, and Table 4
shows those for early school-leavers between ages 18-24. Both tables include
computations of marginal effects at the average value of each variable.
If we consider the effects of educational policies related to attention to pupils
on school failure rates, we find that the pupil-teacher ratio increases school dro-
pout in both female and male students. The same effect is observed for class size
but only for females. Thus, the larger the class size or the pupil-teacher ratio, the
greater the percentage of students who drop out. The same effects are also obser-
ved on the rate of early school-leavers for the pupil-teacher ratio whereas class
size turns out to be not statistically significant in any regression. As regards the
effects of educational expenditure per pupil, we observe that the higher the expen-
diture, the lower the dropout rate among male and female pupils and the lower the
share of male and female early school-leavers.
Therefore, all educational policy variables show the expected results, since
higher levels of educational expenditure per pupil, and lower levels of class size
and pupil-teacher ratios, reduce rates of dropout and early school-leaving (with
the exception of class size in some regressions where it is not statistically signifi-
cant). However, results in Tables 3 and 4 show that the magnitude of these effects
is small. For example, with respect to school dropout, an additional thousand
Euros per pupil, which represents an increase of around 29% of 2003 deflated ex-
penditure, would reduce the female dropout rate by 2.5% (for males the figure is
3.1%). Likewise, a reduction of 1 pupil per class (4.2% in relative terms for 2003)
would lead to a decrease of 0.5% in female dropout. In addition, a decrease of 1
pupil per teacher (8.5%) diminishes both female and male dropout rates by 1.5%.
As indicated, results show the small magnitude of the effects although compari-
sons between the three educational policies are not possible since the cost of the
educational policies related to class size and pupil-teacher ratio are not available.
In addition to the effects of educational policy instruments, we briefly consi-
der the impact of regional environmental characteristics by including variables re-
lated to school, labour market and family variables. Taking the school variables
first, the number of immigrant students is related to higher dropout rates among
female students. Moreover, the higher the percentage of students attending public
schools, the higher the rates of male and female dropout. The effects of these two
variables on school failure could be related to the lower average socioeconomic
level of immigrant students and those attending public schools. As in Peraita and
Pastor (2000) and Petrongolo and San Segundo (2002), regional labour market fe-
atures are significant, especially in dropout rates. We observe a negative relations-
hip between youth unemployment rates and the school dropout rate for all stu-
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dents. This variable only has negative effects on female early school-leavers. Li-
kewise, the average years of schooling of the working-age population correlate
negatively with male and female dropout and with male and female early school-
leavers. Finally, regarding the family environmental variables, the average num-
ber of children per women increases female dropout rates whereas fertility rates
for girls aged 15-19 correlate positively with the female school-leavers rate.
We also introduce a dummy denoting the years in which education was the
responsibility of the central government (MEC, Ministery of Education) and re-
gional expenditure. The interaction of this dummy variable with expenditure per
pupil allows us to capture the effects derived from decentralizing educational res-
ponsibilities. Since this dummy variable (and the interaction) is not statistically
significant, we conclude that decentralization had neither a positive or a negative
effect on school failure rates (results available upon request). However, we should
note that these results only apply to the period considered (1992-2003) and not-
hing can be said with regard to the overall Spanish decentralization process. Furt-
her research is required in order to reach firm conclusions on this issue.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examine the effects of three educational policy instruments
(overall expenditure per pupil, class size and pupil-teacher ratio) on two educatio-
nal outcomes related to academic failure in schools: regional dropout rates at the
end of compulsory education (at age 16), and the share of early school-leavers in
the 18-24 year age group.
The results show that expenditure per pupil and pupil-teacher ratio influence
school dropout in both female and male students: the larger the expenditure per
pupil or the lower the pupil-teacher ratio, the lower the percentage of students
who drop out. The same effects are observed in the case of early school-leavers.
As regards class-size, it correlates positively with dropout rates only for female
students. Therefore, we find that the three educational policy instruments conside-
red (with some exceptions for class-size) reduce failure rates in the Spanish edu-
cation system (especially when dropping out is considered).
Nevertheless, in accordance with most studies at a regional level for the USA,
results also show that the magnitude of these effects is very small [see Hanushek
(2003)]. Thus, they lead us to conclude that the educational policy instruments con-
sidered may be useful to reduce school dropout and early school-leaving although
not significantly. Concerning expenditure, ACs also have to consider whether most
of the increase has to be public or private according to political preferences.
Finally, it can be pointed out that further research is needed to determine the
best policies to reduce school failure rates. This would mean computing the cost
of class size and pupil-teacher rate reductions and analyzing other policies focu-
sed on school and class management as well as on school choice and admission.
In addition, studies with microdata are also needed to evaluate all these policies.
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ANNEX 1: EDUCATIONAL TRANSFER PROCESS
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Autonomous Communities Year of transference
Foral regime
Basque Country 1980
Navarre 1990
Article 151
Andalusia 1982
Canary Islands 1983
Catalonia 1980
Galicia 1982
Valencia 1983
Article 143
Aragon 1998
Asturias 1999
Balearic Islands 1997
Cantabria 1998
Castile-Leon 1999
Castile-La Mancha 1999
Extremadura 1999
Madrid 1999
Murcia 1999
Rioja 1998
Source: Own elaboration.
ANNEX 2: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL
The Ministry of Education provides data for its expenditure in the ACs that it
still administers (that is, where responsibility for education has not been transfe-
rred to the regional government). However, these data refer to the whole territory
administered by this Ministry, and are not broken down by AC. Therefore, in order
to assign educational spending to each region, we used data from the General State
Comptroller (IGAE). Specifically, we assigned the educational spending carried
out by the Ministry of Education in each region for the following programs:
As the table shows, the central government’s education expenditure covers
all programs related to non-university education if these programs are already of-
fered (per region) by the Ministry of Education. Both direct expenditure on pre-
primary and primary education (422A) and secondary and vocational and langua-
ge education (422C), which represent about 90% of non-university expenditure,
are taken into account, as well as the remaining programs such as the funding of
teacher training, out-of-school activities, and complementary services. We think
that these programs promote higher quality education and, therefore, must be con-
sidered. In fact, international studies also include programs of this kind.
We also took into consideration educational expenses incurred by the body
responsible for investments in schools (Junta de Construcciones, Instalaciones y
Equipo Escolar). In the ACs in which the regional government has responsibility
for the educational system, expenditure from the MEC was negligible and was,
therefore, not considered.
Expenditure on all programs included in the analysis is territorially distributed by
AC to a large extent (above 80% depending on each program and year). Within non-
territorialized expenditure, in most of the programs (such as pre-primary, primary, se-
condary, professional education, official language schools and education for disabled
students), 95% of the expenditure is classified under “various regions”, which con-
tains subsidies to private (‘concerted’) schools. This expenditure has been imputed to
each AC depending on the number of students in publicly funded or ‘concerted’ scho-
ols. The figures for other non-regionalized expenditure have not been divided by AC
since they refer to expenditure on central services or expenditure abroad.
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422A Pre-primary and primary education (Educación infantil y primaria)
422C Secondary and vocational education and official language schools
(Educación secundaria, formación profesional y escuelas oficiales de idiomas)
422F Arts (Enseñanzas artísticas)
422J Additional educational support programs (Enseñanza compensatoria)
422K Life-long learning and e-learning for non-university levels of education
(Educación permanente y a distancia no universitaria)
421B Teacher training (Formación permanente del profesorado)
422O New information and communication technologies applied to education
(Nuevas tecnologías aplicadas a la educación)
423B Other educational services (Servicios complementarios a la enseñanza)
423C Support to other educational activities (Apoyo a otras actividades escolares)
542G Educational research (Investigación educativa)
422E Education for disabled students (Educación especial)
Source: Own elaboration.
IGAE data are for the 1992-96 period and, therefore, for 1997-98, interpolation
was needed. This does not create problems because MEC public expenditure is very
stable in all ACs. Table A.2.1 shows data used from the IGAE referring to central
government expenditure on non-university education in each region. Table A.2.2
contains the expenditure of the regional governments and Table A.2.3 that of the
local governments. The final table, A.2.4, contains total public expenditure on non-
university education in each region considering all levels of government. The values
are the result of adding the figures in Tables A.2.1. A.2.2 and A.2.3.
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RESUMEN
El artículo presenta un análisis regional de los efectos de determinadas
políticas educativas, aplicadas en España entre 1992 y 2003, sobre el fra-
caso escolar. En concreto se considera el impacto del gasto por alumno,
el tamaño de la clase y la relación de alumnos por profesor sobre las
tasas de fracaso al final de la educación obligatoria y sobre la proporción
de abandono temprano a la edad de 18-24 años. Nuestros resultados indi-
can que un mayor nivel de gasto educativo por alumno y un menor tama-
ño de clase y de la relación profesor-alumno reducen la tasa de fracaso
escolar y el abandono temprano (aunque el tamaño de la clase no resulta
siempre estadísticamente significativo). Sin embargo, la magnitud de los
efectos de estas variables es pequeña en el nivel medio.
Palabras clave: fracaso escolar, abandono escolar, política educativa re-
gional.
Clasificación JEL: I22, I28, R50.
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